By KEVIN NEVERS
Former Lake Erie Land Company (LEL) president Jerry Mobley was aware, prior
to the $10 million sale of 55 acres at Coffee Creek Center to the Northwest
Indiana Regional Council of Carpenters Pension Fund Trust (PFT), that
$200,000 of the $600,000 commission paid to Sand Creek Sales & Development (SCDC)
brokers Kevin Pastrick and C. Paul Ihle Jr. was going to attorney Peter
Manous as a “finder’s fee.” So alleges a document filed by the PFT in
response to LEL’s September 2006 motion for summary judgment in its favor of
the claims made by the PFT in its lawsuit against LEL.
On Dec. 22 U.S. District Court Judge Robert Miller in Hammond denied LEL’s
motion and confirmed the trial date of June 4, on the grounds that summary
judgment would be inappropriate given the mass of disputed and disputable
facts adduced during discovery by LEL and the PFT. “The court has read and
considered the parties‚ memoranda and much of the 9,000 supporting pages
that were submitted,” Miller ruled. “Genuine issues of material fact abound.
. . . The record poses so many factual issues that the court is not in a
position to designate facts that appear without substantial controversy.”
The basic goal of the PFT’s original lawsuit against LEL—filed in August
2004—is to demonstrate the NiSource Inc. subsidiary’s liability in the
kickback and coverup scandal which sent Pastrick, Ihle, Manous, and PFT
trustee Gerry Nannenga to federal prison.
The scandal in a nutshell: soon after the closure of the deal, on March 1,
1999, Pastrick gave Manous $200,000 of the $600,000 commission which LEL
paid SCSD and, through a dummy corporation, funneled $30,000 to Nannenga.
Manous paid Nannenga a further $15,000 from his share.
Following an investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor, Pastrick and
Manous pleaded guilty to a number of counts including conspiracy, making
payments to a union official to influence the operation of a pension plan,
and obstructing justice. Nannenga pleaded guilty to conspiracy and fraud.
Ihle was convicted of falsifying records and making false statements to
investigators as part of the coverup after the fact. All four served or are
serving prison terms.
The PFT’s lawsuit against LEL has essentially two premises: that LEL
principals had knowledge before closure of Pastrick’s intended kickback to
Manous; and that LEL defrauded the PFT by knowingly selling it significantly
overvalued property. In its original lawsuit the PFT named no names and only
speculated on the likelihood that LEL principals must have been aware of the
kickback before the fact: LEL principals could hardly not have been aware,
the lawsuit contends, and in any case the relationship between LEL and SCSD
was sufficiently close to make the former “vicariously liable” for
Pastrick’s criminal acts.
In its response to LEL’s motion for summary judgment, however, the PFT—citing
Pastrick’s deposition in February 2006 and Ihle’s in June 2006—specifically
maintains that “Prior to the March 1, 1999, sale, Mobley was advised that
Manous would receive a payment in connection with the sale.”
Citing Mobley’s own deposition in October 2005, the PFT does note that
Mobley “could not recall whether he was told of a payment before or after
the sale, nor could he recall whether he was told that the person to whom
such a fee was going to be paid was Manous.” But then, citing Mobley’s
interview with the Department of Labor in December 2002—long before the
indictments against Pastrick and the others were unsealed in September
2003—the PFT contends that “Mobley indicated that he was aware that Manous
had received part of SCSD’s commission.”
The PFT also quotes Nannenga, from his September 2005 deposition, to the
effect that Mobley suggested to Nannenga that Pastrick and Manous should buy
Nannenga a golf membership. “(A)t some point in time Mr. Mobley had said to
me something about that Those boys should buy you a golf membership or
something,” the PFT quotes Nannenga. “And I said, Why is that? And he said
something like, They made a lot of money or whatever on this deal. . . . And
then it was after that when Peter (Manous) gave me the $15,000 check that he
said, Here, you can play golf wherever you want to play golf or whatever.”
For the PFT the significance of Mobley’s alleged prior knowledge of the
kickback is that in the government mandated HUD-1 settlement statement—filed
as part of the closure and “expressly requir(ing) the disclosure of all
commissions paid in connection with the transaction,” including those paid
outside of the settlement—LEL disclosed only the $600,000 commission to SCSD
and not the $200,000 payment to Manous.
In fact LEL’s motion for summary judgment and the PFT’s response to that
motion make for interesting reading. In general LEL argues the law, while
the PFT argues its version of the facts.
LEL maintains that the “heart” of the PFT’s lawsuit is the claim that the
deal, which closed on March 1, 1999, “was somehow procured by fraud.” But
under Indiana law, LEL contends, a plaintiff claiming fraud must prove,
among other things, that the defendant made “a material representation of
past or existing facts” which was “false.” A claim of fraud, that is, so LEL
cites case law, may not be based on “promises to be performed in the future
. . . nor, as a general rule, do expressions of opinion constitute fraud.”
Therefore, LEL concludes, “Whatever representations may have been made
concerning the value of the property are irrelevant—not only are they
statements of opinion, but there is also no question that Plaintiffs had
more than a reasonable opportunity to examine the property and judge its
value.”
PFT responds to LEL’s argument by law with an argument by (alleged) fact:
•“LEL’s own internal analysis,” the PFT maintains, “showed average lot
prices in the development that were approximately 24 percent lower than the
average lot price of $35,000 that LEL provided to” appraiser Jack White, who
conducted an appraisal of the property for the PFT prior to the sale.
•Mobley “understood that 20 years would be required to develop the property
in the development,” the PFT contends, “not the eight to 12 years that LEL
had provided to White” and appraiser Tim Harris, who also conducted an
appraisal for the PFT prior to the sale.
•“LEL had no appraisal or other basis for its representations that before an
additional five acres were added, an investment of 50 acres of the
development was worth more than $11 million,” the PFT maintains, “and in
fact LEL’s own analyses suggested that such an investment was worth no more
than $5.7 million.”
•“LEL’s profit from the sale of the investment to the (PFT) would be three
to four times greater than the average profit that (Mobley) sought to
realize from the sale of property,” the PFT contends.
•In neither White’s nor Harris’ appraisal, the PFT contends, was the
specific acreage being appraised actually identified, and both conducted an
appraisal on a 100-acre purchase at a price of $20 million, not on a 55-acre
purchase at $10 million.
•Subsequent appraisals of the property in question, the PFT maintains, put
the fair market value of the acreage at substantially less than $10 million:
on June 30, 2004, $4,779,000; and on June 30, 2005, $3.91 million.
•“The only appraisal of the investment fair market value as of March 1,
1999, was completed by the (PFT’s) appraisal expert in 2005,” the PFT
contends, “and it indicates that the investment was worth no more than $4.48
million as of March 1, 1999.”
The Relationship between LEL and SCSD
Continuing its theme, established in the original lawsuit, of the close
relationship between LEL and SCSD, the PTF maintains that, “SCSD’s separate
incorporation nothwithstanding,” Pastrick and Ihle “were part of the LEL’s
corporate organization.”
Among other things, the PFT alleges the following:
•The “organizational flow chart in the (LEL’s employee manual) identifies
SCSD as one of the departments reporting to the director of operations” of
LEL.
•“SCSD personnel received NIPSCO’s Code of Integrity and Business Ethics
Program Administration Policy.”
•“Bills addressed to SCSD were often paid by LEL, instead of SCSD paying
them and then obtaining reimbursement for the same from LEL.”
•“Ihle and Pastrick were given the power to sign closing documents on LEL’s
behalf, pay money on LEL’s behalf, and receive money on LEL’s behalf.”
•“Pastrick publicly described himself as LEL’s agent, and his lawyer
characterized him as effectively an employee of LEL in a sentencing
memorandum presented to the court in criminal proceedings.”
Under common law, the PFT argues in the original lawsuit, the close
relationship between the two entities makes LEL “vicariously liable for” the
criminal acts perpetrated by Pastrick and Ihle, and “by proximate result of”
LEL’s conduct the PFT and its Board of Trustees “have suffered injury to
their business and property by an amount to be determined at trial but
believed to exceed $5 million.”
The PFT defines that injury more explicitly in its response to LEL’s motion
for summary judgement. “One component of (the PFT’s) losses arises from the
initial overpayment of approximately $5.5 million for the investment,” the
PFT argues. “A second discreet component . . . arises from the investment
losses sustained by reason of the opportunities foregone to make other
investments.”
Posted 1/5/2007